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Criminal Law -SELF-DEFENSE-RETREAT-INSTRUCTION ON DE-
FENSE OF HOME NEED NOT BE GIVEN WHERE VICTIM AND ACCUSED ARE
MEMBERS OF SAME HOUSEHOLD, Conner v. State, 361 So.2d 774 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 368 So.2d 1364 (1979).
On November 5, 1976, Perry Conner was shot to death by his
mother.' At trial the mother contended that her mentally disturbed
son had attacked and threatened to kill her. Despite her plea of self-
defense, the mother, Annie Mae Conner, was adjudged guilty of
manslaughter. Alleging that the trial judge erred by refusing to give
a jury instruction on "defense of home," Annie Mae Conner ap-
pealed.2
In Conner v. State, 3 the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed
the conviction. The court held that the "defense of home" instruc-
tion need no longer be given in cases where the assailant and the
assailed are legal occupants of the same "castle."' The court rea-
soned that the retreat instruction given to the jury adequately pro-
tected the defendant's privilege of self-defense. 5 The defendant ap-
pealed to the Florida Supreme Court, which denied certiorari.' In
view of the denial of certiorari, the Conner decision is significant
because it signals the approaching end of the application of the
castle doctrine if both the assailant and the accused are legal resi-
dents of the same home.
The castle doctrine is of ancient origin and provides that a person
attacked in his dwelling is under no duty to retreat.7 The doctrine
1. Brief for Appellee at 4, Conner v. State, 361 So.2d 774 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978),
cert. denied, 368 So. 2d 1364 (1979).
2. Conner v. State, 361 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 368
So. 2d 1364 (1979). "Shortly before her arrest, Appellant made a sworn statement to police
admitting that she fired one shot toward the floor which hit the deceased. She further stated
that she armed herself after the deceased threatened to kill her." Brief for Appellant at 1.
3. 361 So. 2d at 775.
4. Id. 774-76. The "defense of home" instruction reads:
One unlawfully attacked in his own home or on his own premises has no duty to
retreat and may lawfully stand his ground and meet force with force, including
deadly force, if necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself
or another, or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.
THE SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES, FLORIDA
STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 64 (2d ed. 1975) (hereinafter cited as
STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS).
5. 361 So. 2d at 775-76. The "retreat" instruction which was given provides:
If attacked by another, even though the attack is wrongful, he has the legal duty
to retreat if by doing so he can avoid the necessity of using deadly force without
increasing his own danger, but a person placed in a position of imminent danger of
death or great bodily harm to himself by the wrongful attack of another has no duty
to retreat if to do so would increase his own danger of death or great bodily harm.
STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 4, at 64.
6. 368 So. 2d 1364. (Fla. 1979).
7. 40 AM. JUR. 2d Homicide § 167 (1962).
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derives its name from the maxim, "a man's home is his castle," and
has probably been retained due to "an instinctive feeling that a
home is sacred, and that it is improper to require a man to submit
to pursuit from room to room in his own house."'8 Some courts have
extended this doctrine to include the area surrounding the home;9
other courts have further expanded the doctrine to include automo-
biles.'"
Authority is divided as to whether the castle doctrine is applica-
ble to situations where both the assailant and the assailed share the
same living quarters." A number of states adhere to the proposition
that the status of the assailant makes no difference. Courts in
several of these states have quoted the court's rhetorical language
in Jones v. State: "Why, it may be inquired, should one retreat from
his own house, when assailed by a partner or co-tenant, any more
than when assailed by a stranger who is lawfully on the premises?
Wither shall he flee, and how far, and when may he be permitted
to return?"'"
In Florida, Pell v. State" was an early case involving the issue
pondered in Jones. Pell, the appellant, had been convicted of the
second degree murder of a trespasser. The Florida Supreme Court
reversed, citing the failure of the trial judge to instruct the jury on
the nonnecessity of retreat when one is attacked in his home.' 5 As
authority, the court cited Allen v. United States," where the United
States Supreme Court found no error in the lower court's instruction
to the jury that the defendant was under a duty to retreat as far as
possible before slaying his assailant. The court indicated that had
Allen been attacked in his home, he would have been under no
obligation to retreat. 7 Neither Pell nor Allen, however, involved an
attack by a cotenant.
8. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 19, at 111 (4th ed. 1971) (citing
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Commentary to § 84 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1931)).
9. State v. Frizzelle, 89 S.E.2d 725, 726 (N.C. 1955).
10. State v. Borwick, 187 N.W. 460, 463 (Iowa 1922).
11. Annot., 26 A.L.R. 3d 1296, 1299-1306 (1969).
12. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 261 So. 2d 783, 785, cert. denied, 261 So. 2d 785 (Ala. 1972)
(husband or wife may defend common home against the other); People v. Lenkevich, 229
N.W.2d 298, 300 (Mich. 1975) (assailant was husband of the accused); People v. Tomlins,
107 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1914) (assailant son of the accused living in same home); State v.
Grantham, 77 S.E.2d 291, 292 (S.C. 1953) (assailant wife of accused).
13. 76 Ala. 8, 16 (1884). See also People v. McGrandy, 156 N.W.2d 48, 49 (Mich. Ct. App.
1967); People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497-98 (N.Y. 1914).
14. 122 So. 110 (Fla. 1929).
15. Id. at 116. Pell allegedly shot and killed an armed officer who was attempting to search
his garage. The officer possessed an invalid search warrant at the time of the shooting. Id. at
114-15.
16. 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
17. Id. at 498.
CASE COMMENTS
In 1965, the Florida Supreme Court again applied the castle doc-
trine in Hedges v. State.'8 Ms. Hedges had appealed a conviction
for the first degree murder of her boyfriend, who was on the premises
pursuant to an invitation from the accused.'9 Citing Pell, the su-
preme court reversed, finding that the trial judge erred by failing
to instruct the jury that a person attacked in his home is under no
duty to retreat.20
Prior to Conner v. State, only two Florida cases applied the castle
doctrine to circumstances where the assailant and the accused were
legal residents of the same home. Like Conner, both Watkins v.
State" and Stevenson v. State22 were decided by the Fourth District
Court of Appeal. Elizabeth Watkins killed her common law hus-
band while arguing with him in their common dwelling. The appel-
late court found the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the
nonnecessity of retreat from the home to be reversible error. The
Watkins court relied on Hedges v. State despite the fact that the
victim in Hedges was simply an invitee, having no authority or
control over the premises.2 3 The Watkins court stated, "A person
attacked in his own dwelling, under conditions otherwise entitling
him to strike in self-defense, is not required to retreat although his
assailant also resides in the same dwelling. "24
In 1973, the fourth district reaffirmed the Watkins holding in
Stevenson v. State. The Stevenson court, relying solely on Watkins,
held that the castle doctrine does apply "to a situation where both
parties are on the premises in question with equal authority and
control."25
In Conner, however, the Fourth District Court of Appeal receded
from the Watkins/Stevenson position. Judge Letts, writing for a
unanimous court, stated that the doctrine is no longer applicable if
both the assailant and the assailed are "legal occupants of the same
'castle,' neither one having the legal right to eject the other .... ,,26
A frequently advanced argument in favor of the castle doctrine is
that a person should not be required to abandon his home to avoid
confronting an assailant. This argument places considerable weight
on the notion that the home is a sacred place, a refuge for its occu-
pants. "The sense in which [a man's] house has a peculiar immun-
18. 172 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1965).
19. Id. at 825-26.
20. Id. at 827.
21. 197 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
22. 285 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
23. 197 So. 2d at 313.
24. Id. (citing Baugh v. State, 112 So. 157, 159 (Ala. 1927)) (emphasis supplied).
25. 285 So. 2d at 61.
26. 361 So. 2d at 776.
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ity is, that it is sacred for the protection of his person and of his
family. ' ' 17 Florida statutory law reflects a similar sentiment. 8
It has been said that the castle doctrine "[i]n its original appli-
cations . . .doubtless had in view only attacks from external ag-
gressors .... ,,29 Notwithstanding the validity of this statement,
the fact remains that the doctrine evolved from a period when a
man's home was his fortress against the attacks of his enemies and
retreat from the home was dangerous. A man's "castle" was more
removed from the protection of the community in earlier times and
police protection was not what it is today. Thus it could be argued
that modem, instantaneous communications systems have made
the castle doctrine obsolete.
Even if the retention of the castle doctrine is deemed necessary
for the ultimate protection of the home and family, there is little
justification for applying it to situations where one lawful occupant
is attacked by another in their common dwelling. Family members
often become engaged in bitter quarrels which they later regret. In
fact, a majority of murders are committed by a member of the
victim's family or a friend or acquaintance.30 Many of these killings
occur in the home. 31 Thus, if the major concern of the proponents
of the castle doctrine is the sanctity of the home and the protection
of the family, the logical approach is to limit the doctrine to attacks
from external aggressors. Nothing could render the home less sacred
and family members less protected than a rule which would allow a
legal occupant of a dwelling the right to stand his ground and use
deadly force against a cotenant instead of retreating from the dwell-
ing.
Requiring a person to make a safe retreat, if possible, rather than
permitting him to slay a lawful occupant and possibly a family
member would reinforce, rather than undermine, the "sanctity" of
the home. Requiring a person to retreat when attacked in his home
by another occupant instead of allowing the assailed to retaliate
27. State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308, 320-21 (1873).
28. FLA. STAT. § 782.02 (1977) provides that: "The use of deadly force is justifiable when
a person is resisting any attempt to murder such person or to commit any felony upon him
or upon or in any dwelling house in which such person shall be." But see FLA. STAT. § 782.11
(1977) which states: "Whoever shall unnecessarily kill another, either while resisting an
attempt by such other person to commit any felony, or to do any other unlawful act .. shall
be deemed guilty of manslaughter .... "
29. Watts v. State, 59 So. 270, 273 (Ala. 1912).
30. V. SWIGERT & R. FARRELL, MURDER, INEQUALITY, AND THE LAW 51 (1976); E. TANAY, THE
MURDERERS 8 (1976); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1977, at 12; see
Edwards, Commentary: Murder and Gun Control, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1335, 1336 (1972).
31. "It is a matter of common knowledge that a majority of all homicides are committed
by close relatives and friends, many of these killings occurring in the home." 361 So. 2d at
776. See also V. SWIGERT & R. FARRELL, supra note 30, at 51.
CASE COMMENTS
would also provide for a "cooling off" period. The statewide adop-
tion of the limited castle doctrine would not jeopardize life, but tend
to preserve it, since a person in Florida is under no duty to retreat
"if to do so would increase his own danger of death or great bodily
harm." 3
The fourth district is the only Florida court that has applied the
castle doctrine where the assailant and the accused were legal occu-
pants of the same dwelling.3 In Conner, the fourth district held that
the castle doctrine is no longer applicable to such cases.34 Since the
Florida Supreme Court denied certiorari, it is doubtful whether
"defense of home" can ever successfully be utilized in any Florida
district if one lawful occupant is accused of killing another.
TIMOTHY C. HERBERT
32. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 4, at 64. In the Conner case, for example,
the son of the defendant had run in and out of the house during the prolonged argument. If
the mother was in actual fear of her life, she could have locked the doors and called the police,
or simply left the house. See Brief for Appellee at 6.
33. 361 So. 2d at 776.
34. Id.
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